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Abstract
As technology has become pervasive in our lives we record our daily activities both
intentionally and unintentionally. Because of this, the amount of potential evidence
found on digital media is staggering. Investigators have had to adapt and change their
methods of conducting investigations to address the data volume. Digital forensics
examiners current process consists of performing string searches to identify potential
evidentiary items. Items of interest must then go through association, target com-
parison, and event reconstruction processes. These are manual and time consuming
tasks for an examiner. This thesis presents a user interface that combines both the
string searching capabilities that begin an investigation with automated correlation
and abstraction into a single timeline visualization. The capability to improve an
examiner’s process is evaluated on the tools ability to reduce the number of results
to sort through while accurately presenting key items for three use cases.
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Digital Forensics Tools Integration
I. Introduction
1.1 Problem Background
The digital age ushered in various forms of technology for entertainment and
productivity purposes. People now own computers, laptops, tablets, mobile phones,
smart TVs, and other Internet of Things devices that store the details of their ac-
tivities. It is estimated by 2025, the number of connected devices would rise to 75
billion devices with the average person estimated to own nine smart devices [1]. These
numbers do not include the various devices people may have in the form of virtual
machines and such that are utilized in cloud environments.
With the growing number of both physical and virtual devices, the demand for
investigators capable of conducting digital forensics is increasing. Law enforcement
agencies have been attempting to catch-up by using digital forensics tools that provide
high-level abstraction and hide the intricate details, increasing the user base capable
of collecting digital evidence. But even with this increase, case backlog is an on-going
issue because of the sheer number of devices a single person may own.
1.2 Motivation
The first 48 hours of an investigation are critical [2]. After an allegation is received
and an investigation is launched, the first few hours can determine the outcome. Per-
ishable evidence such as DNA or testimony, can be permanently lost if the correct
actions are not taken immediately. Investigators must utilize the initial hours effec-
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tively to determine the best course of action based on the limited information they
gathered. Because of this, digital media is typically not utilized to create investigative
leads but rather used to confirm hypotheses developed later. The time it takes to
process and analyze digital evidence is not conducive to quickly generating a favorable
course. Many factors contribute to the lengthy time it takes to process digital evi-
dence; not having an investigator with the skills to conduct the examination readily
available, the speed of the tools, the number of devices, and the locations to search on
said devices. But as technology becomes more pervasive in our lives, the information
stored on these devices have become increasingly necessary to produce investigative
leads within this 48-hour window.
Even outside of this window, the number of devices gathered throughout inves-
tigations has created a backlog for the digital forensics examiners who are in short
supply.
“The requirement for digital forensics investigation has
ballooned, and law enforcement agencies throughout the world
are scrambling to address this demand. While more and more
members of law enforcement are being trained to perform the
required investigations, the supply is not keeping up with the
demand. Current digital forensics techniques are arduously
time consuming and require a significant amount of man
power to execute [3].
There is a need to create digital forensics tools that can triage the devices for
important information necessary during the initial phase of the investigation. At the
same time, there is a need to be able to process and analyze devices in a timely
manner to keep up with the demand and prevent delays in investigations.
2
1.3 Research Objectives
The methods of analysis require change as the amount of data produced and stored
on disk media continues to grow. Some of the challenges that require address are the
correlation of data from heterogeneous event sources [4]. New applications and uses of
technology are being developed daily. With this comes a variety of different methods
of storage and data is no longer confined to the local single workstations. In fact
important pieces of information can be stored in “the Cloud” where only remnants of
the original data remain in the local cache. Because of this, digital forensics analysis
will have to address the challenge of taking data from different sources and combining
them into some base-level commonality for analysis.
The overarching research goal is to reduce the analysis time spent by exam-
iners during the digital forensics process. The research objective was to improve
upon a visualization method Temporal Analysis Integration Management Applica-
tion (TAIMA) employed, which allowed examiners to quickly digest the results of
disk media analysis, and its back-end database, Property Graph Event Reconstruc-
tion (PGER), that provided a method for efficient data queries and enabled automated
event correlation. This research first examined how the tools fit into a common dig-
ital forensics examination process and adding the string searching capabilities they
require to improve an examiner’s process.
The resulting application Event Correlation and Abstraction Timeline Visualiza-
tion (ECATV) creates a keyword filterable timeline to be used in conjunction with
Autopsy, an open source digital forensics tool. The filterable timeline visualization
was created to make analysis easier by combining various tools and sources of data.
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1.4 Results
ECATV was tested on three different scenarios and evaluated based on its abil-
ity to reduce the number of results an examiner must sort through and its ability
to still locate the key pieces of digital evidence. The tool was able to reduce the
number of hits by upwards of 90% and located over 70% of the key pieces of digital
evidence. Overall, ECATV significantly reduces the amount of data to sort through
while maintaining the ability to locate the necessary information.
1.5 Conclusion
Humans produce data at an increasing rate and digital forensics must develop
new tools and methods to keep up with technology. Native graph databases have
proven to provide an efficient means for data queries and abstraction creation through
relationships created between events. Visualization methods have proven to allow
digital forensics examiners to spend less time during the human-analysis portion of
the digital forensics process. ECATV was made to combine the benefits of using a
native graph database through PGER and a visualization method through TAIMA
with a new keyword search filter option. This research examines the benefits of
combining multiple digital forensics results from multiple sources and tools leading
to a more efficient examination.
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II. Background and Literature Review
There are many facets that need to be taken into account to create a forensically
sound tool. Digital forensics examinations are a complicated process that involves not
only technical aspects but also legal considerations. Development of Event Correlation
and Abstraction Timeline Visualization (ECATV) requires first closely examining
what the digital forensics process entails and where in that process the tool can
improve the efficiency of examinations. It also needs to ensure it follows the criteria
for forensic soundness for a viable tool. Lastly, it is important to review tools and
the features they already employ to both warrant the development of a new tool and
for inspiration.
The first section goes over the aspects of the digital forensics process and the
common phases associated to an examination. The next section explains information
visualization and how it applies to the forensic analysis phase. The third section
explains the rules and criteria for a forensically sound process. The last three sections
provide an overview of the currently available and widely used digital forensics tools.
2.1 Forensic Process
Before looking into building a tool for digital forensics, we present the current
process used for digital investigations. There are many models out there with one of
the first outlined in 1984, called the Computer Forensic Investigative Process (CFIP).
It was a simple model that helped establish a basic outline. CFIP consisted of four
phases: acquisition, identification, evaluation, and admission. The acquisition phase
involved acquiring the physical evidence in an acceptable manner with proper au-
thority, just like any evidence in an investigation. The identification phases involved
tasks to identify the digital components from the evidence and converting it into a
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format understood by humans. The evaluation phase was to determine which dig-
ital pieces of evidence were relevant to the investigation and final admission phase
involved presenting said evidence in the court of law.
2.1.1 Common Phases of Digital Forensics
Yousef, et al. [5] reviewed a total of 15 different models suggested by various
authors from 1984 to 2010. Through a systematic process, they identified the common
digital investigation phases. In total, the authors extracted 46 phases associated to
the 15 digital forensics investigation models. Then the authors sorted the phases and
placed them into 5 generic groups based on tasks performed in each of the phases.
The resulting Generic Computer Forensic Investigation Model (GCFIM) [5] in-
volves five different phases. The first phase, pre-process, involves all the tasks needed
to be done prior to obtaining the data. These tasks include obtaining the necessary
approval from authority, setting up the tools needed, and other preparatory tasks.
The second phase, acquisition and preservation, involves identifying, acquiring, col-
lecting, transporting, storing, and preserving of data [5]. The third phase, analysis,
involves the various types of analysis on the acquired evidence to identify the rele-
vant evidence for the crime being investigated. Phase 4, presentation, involves the
proper documentation from the analysis phase and presenting evidence in a manner
understood by all. The last phase, post-process, involves proper return of evidence,
review of the investigative process/lessons learned to improve future investigations.
GCFIM, illustrated in Figure 1, is also cyclic. Because the investigative tools,
technology, skills of the digital forensics examiner, and crime scenes are always chang-
ing, the authors wanted to ensure that the ability to go back to previous phases was
always present. Lastly, the authors placed the phase, Incident Response, into the
post-process phase of their model because they believe any action or response taken
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Figure 1: Generic Computer Forensic Investigation Model [5].
should be done after the evidence has been properly analyzed and presented. But
there may be cases where immediate response is required, and the authors leave that
prerogative up to the investigator. Most investigators prefer to delay action until all
possible evidence has been gathered and analyzed. But there are instances when time
is the dominating factor and investigators must act on the information immediately,
for safety concerns or securing perishable evidence. It is important to recognize the
digital forensics investigative process requires a flexible framework.
The authors present a model that accounts for all the different phases represented
by various digital forensics models published throughout the years. But they do not
consider the different phases for specific investigations. For example, the phases for an
arson investigation will be different from the phases for a sexual assault case. Though
the authors main purpose is to create a generic model for digital forensics investiga-
tions, it seems a little oversimplified. Nonetheless, there is still merit in establishing
a standard model that aggregates all the various models presented throughout the
years to base off of for future work.
The GCFIM is a starting point to building ECATV. The two phases ECATV
should focus on are the analysis and presentation phase. Analysis should process
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large amounts of events and artifacts simultaneously and triage the relevant hits.
This will help identify areas containing potential evidence and a digital forensics ex-
aminer can do a deeper dive into the relevant locations instead of having to conduct
a full examination on the entire device. The presentation is an output in a pre-
sentable format to authorities. A solution is a timeline sorted by relevant events and
timestamps presented in an easy-to-read format.
2.1.2 Forensic Computing
McKemmish [6] provides a similar framework to the GCFIM. His description of the
digital forensics process identifies four phases: identification, preservation, analysis,
and presentation, shown in Figure 2.
Identification allows examiners to determine what evidence is present and the tools
necessary to extract the relevant evidentiary data from electronic media. Once exam-
iners have identified the tools and methods necessary to conduct examinations, proper
preservation of physical items is necessary to ensure the data obtained is admissible
in court. This requires preserving the original data and conducting examinations that
minimally impact the original data, usually done by taking either logical or physical
extractions of the digital media. The main bulk of digital forensics centers around
the analysis process, where examiners extract, process, and interpret digital data [6].
The last piece is presentation, where examiners must prepare a report for court that
is easily digestible for all present, especially the jury and the judge. The first three
phases are centered around technical aspects while the final phase is based entirely
on legal issues, such as policy and law.
Figure 2: Forensic Process.
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2.1.3 Analysis
The Analysis phase is considered the primary element of digital investigations
and involves the process of “extraction, processing, and interpretation of digital data
[6].” This phase takes a significant portion of the time to complete a digital forensics
investigation. Thus, digital forensics tools developed to reduce the time consumed in
this phase will have a larger impact in decreasing case back-logs than tools focused
on reducing time spent on the other phases.
The period of analysis can be reduced in two main ways. One path involves
increasing the efficiency of the digital forensics tool’s extraction and processing of
data through hardware and/or software upgrades. The overall goal would be to
reduce the time forensic examiners wait for a tool to create an image of the data
and to process the image into human readable format. The other method decreases
the time an examiner spends during the interpretation portion of the analysis phase.
Examiners are faced with the issue of sorting through tons of information irrelevant to
the investigation. The reduction in human analysis can be accomplished by presenting
the processed data in a way that allows examiners to quickly analyze the information
or by providing only data that is relevant to the investigation. But the latter is difficult
because each investigation is unique and developing a tool that is able to determine
what information is relevant to a case is a non-trivial task. Instead this study focuses
on presenting the information provided by digital forensics tools in a more manageable
format, thereby reducing the human analysis time spent by examiners.
2.2 Information Visualization
Information visualization has been shown to provide examiners and analysts with
the ability to process large amounts of data in a meaningful way [7] [8]. The De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) established the National Visualization and
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Analytics Center (NVAC) to “advance the state of the science to enable analysts to
detect the expected and discover the unexpected from massive and dynamic infor-
mation streams and databases consisting of data of multiple types and from multiple
sources, even though the data are often conflicting and incomplete [9].” Though
NVAC was originally established to combat terrorism issues, its goals closely align
with the needs for the digital forensics field [4].
Visual analytics is defined as the science of analytical reasoning facilitated by
interactive visual interfaces. It is utilized to develop meaning from massive and
dynamic data [9]. The insights from this field of research [10] can be directly applied
to developing better digital forensics tools to reduce the human analysis time of a
digital investigation. There are many visualization techniques that can be used to
display data for digital forensics, ranging from simple x-y plots and line graphs to
more complex methods such as dense pixel visualization [11]. There is no one method
that is considered the best technique to visualize data. The performance of each
visualization technique is data dependent and purpose driven.
This is further reinforced by the taxonomy of visualization, which has been his-
torically categorized into scientific and information visualization [12]. Scientific visu-
alization often involves scientific data with a spatial component such as wind tunnel
data whereas information visualization involves discrete and non-spatial data such as
financial information. Typically continuous visualization models are utilized to render
scientific visualizations while discrete visualization models are used for information
visualization. [12] illustrates though digital forensics data lies under the information
visualization umbrella, because not all data sets contain only one type of data, both
discrete and continuous visualization methods can be used. What is more impor-
tant is the conceptualization of the data drives the most appropriate visualization
technique.
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2.2.1 Forensic Analysis through Visualization
Teerlink [13] argues there is a need for software tools that reduce efforts spent
by examiners, especially when it comes to handling large amounts of data. Analysts
squander a lot of time trying to sort through massive amounts of data that are un-
correlated to the investigation. Teerlink proposes visualization techniques can reduce
time wasted and direct examiners to the “suspicious files”. His tool differs from the
traditional forensic tools such as EnCase by providing advanced visualization tech-
niques that aid data correlation and analysis beyond a simple front-end GUI [13]. The
tool utilizes two different techniques: non-hierarchical and hierarchical visualization
techniques.
Non-hierarchical visualization displays files and their statistics without taking
into consideration the relationships between files and directories. For example, the
tool highlights larger files with light colored blocks and smaller files with darker col-
ored blocks. This helps the examiner quickly identify anomalous files. The tool can
also be filtered based on a different attribute, such as time where the lighter col-
ored blocks represent files with more recent activity. Ultimately Teerlink allows the
tool to filter accordingly to any available file attributes because different investiga-
tions require examinations of different file attributes. The hierarchical visualization
technique employed allows the tool to show the relationships between files and its di-
rectory structures. Teerlink’s tool utilizes filtered tree maps that are filterable based
on file attributes, not just the traditional method of display based on file size. Again
this allows flexibility for the examiners to filter accordingly to the different scenarios
of their investigation. For example, the tool can display a tree map of the files and
use red to represent image files while yellow represents system binaries. This allows
examiners to easily spot out-of-place files, such as a red colored image file contained
in a file structure full of yellow colored system binaries.
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Teerlink conducted a user test to determine the effectiveness of the tool’s visu-
alisation environment. He instructed users to locate an unknown number of files
related to drug trafficking using two different methods. The first method involved
using traditional Linux commands such as ls, cd, grep, file, md5sum, state, and find
[13]. Teerlink argued these commands provided similar capabilities to those of En-
Case’s analysis tools, minus the front-end GUI. The second method involved analysis
through Teerlink’s developed visualization techniques. Users were also asked to record
the time their examination began, the discovery time and name of each suspect file,
and when their examination ended. Based on this data, Teerlink discovered the visu-
alization techniques helped examiners discover on average 53% more files than using
the more traditional method. More importantly to this study, the test showed there
was a 35% reduction in time and examiners were 57% faster in locating the first
suspicious file. In digital forensics, it is nearly impossible for examiners to say with
a 100% certainty they found every piece of digital evidence. Instead they conclude
their examinations when they have enough evidence to present in court, based on
legal advice and law enforcement guidance. Sometimes all an examiner needs is to
find the first piece of the puzzle in the sea of ambiguous data, which leads to vari-
ous pieces of evidence until eventually the necessary amount to prove criminality is
collected. Teerlink concludes the goal was not to develop a complete tool to compete
with EnCase, but rather to integrate EnCase’s outputs of its search capabilities as
an input for the visualization environment.
2.3 Forensically Sound
Defining what it means for a process to be forensically sound is essential to en-
suring the admissibility of digital evidence [6]. From a legal perspective, admissible
evidence must be reliable; key factors include whether the evidence is generally ac-
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cepted in its respective scientific community as well as whether the methods used to
derive the evidence are repeatable and produce the same results. There are many
companies and organizations that state their digital forensics tool utilizes a forensi-
cally sound process to produce its data. Because of this, many different definitions of
a digitally forensic process float around.
McKemmish [14] provides a more stable framework for the definition of “foren-
sically sound” in regards to digital forensics. The paper considers a disk imaging
process to be forensically sound when the process produces an exact representation
of the original, the duplicated data is independently authenticated as being a true
copy, and the process produces an audit trail. Overall the goal is to produce evi-
dence that preserves the data in the state it was first discovered while the process
does not diminish the evidentiary value of the data “through technical, procedural,
or interpretive errors.”
2.3.1 Four Rules of a Forensically Sound Process
The overall objective of digital forensics is to provide evidence in the court of
law. Along those lines, McKemmish [6] provides four rules aimed at maximizing the
admissibility of evidence produced by a digital forensics process, outlined in Figure 3.
Rule 1 is considered the absolute important rule as examination in any forensic process
(digital or physical) should minimize the likelihood of alteration of the evidentiary
item. If alteration is necessary, then the examiners should do their best to duplicate
the original and examine the duplicate data. Rule 2 follows the same vein as rule
1 where if changes to the item are unavoidable, these changes must be properly
documented with proper reasoning for doing so. This is part of the reason why
being a digital forensics examiner is difficult as the ability to identify the extent of
alterations is directly correlated to the examiner’s skill and knowledge. The examiner
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must be able to provide testimony as to why the changes were unavoidable as well as
its extent and at the same time in a way the common person in a jury can understand.
Rule 3 states the application and development of forensic tools should be done
with the rules of evidence in mind. This means whatever is done to the data, it should
not lessen the admissibility of the final product. Lastly, rule 4 is similar to rule 2
in that an examiner should not conduct an examination that is beyond his or her
knowledge. As stated in rule 2, it is essential an examiner has the ability to explain
in detail the process of the examination and the extent of unavoidable changes done
on the evidentiary item. It does not matter how forensically sound a tool is if the
examiner is unable to properly explain the process in court.
Rule 2 and 4 are relevant but are cursory to goals of this research. It is impor-
tant the tool has some level of granularity, such as providing file paths for artifacts
discovered. But the two rules correlate more to the abilities of the examiner. Rule
3 relates to the forensic process and policies of how the examiners secure evidence.
Generally most examiners and investigatory agencies will image drives and operate on
the duplicates [15], which also relates to rule 1. Rule 1 is met by importing the cloned
data into a visualization software. It introduces additional steps and time spent to
analyze the image, but [6] states it is justified if it allows examiners to identify key
Figure 3: Rules for Forensic Computing [6].
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items in a shorter time.
2.3.2 Evaluation Criteria for Forensic Soundness
McKemmish [14] provides four criteria for determining forensic soundness of the
process, which are outlined in figure 4. Tassone, et al. [16] further breaks down the
evaluation criteria into additional steps for consideration with regards to visualization
methods. Criterion one, meaning, needs to consider repeatability, allowing data to be
visualized without altering or changing the actual artifacts. This means if the same
data is revisualized at a different time or location, it produces the same results. It
also needs to consider lucidity, where the visualization generated by the tool is easily
understood by the forensic examiner. Criterion two requires anomaly detection where
it provides the examiner with the ability to identify unusual data sets.
Criterion three is the most important area for this research. Tassone, et al. [16]
further breaks down the transparency criterion for forensic visualization into granu-
larity and filterable. Granularity with respect to the visualization method means it
provides an overview of the data while allowing the examiner to delve into greater
details of the artifacts if necessary. And filterable allows examiners to refine the vi-
sualization to key items either through text searches or time stamps. Filtering allows
examiners to identify key items in less time, which is relevant to rule one mentioned
in Section 2.3.1.
Criterion four does not directly correlate to developing a forensically sound visu-
alization tool. But Tassone, et al. [16] states that it can be aided by the use of a
timeline visualization method. Timelines provide the examiners with how the data
was utilized over time, allowing them to analyze large data sets. Usually investigators
are focused on a specific time period and timelines allow examiners to focus on these
periods and expanding the scope if needed.
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Figure 4: Evaluation Criteria for Forensic Soundness [14].
2.4 Forensic Tools
There are many different open source and commercial forensic tools available.
Each tool processes and analyzes drive images using different methods. The tools also
utilize varying visualization methods depending on what its developers determined
is suitable to forensic examiners. Because these tools were developed with different
interpretations of what data is relevant and how it should be displayed, it is important
to keep in mind rule four of a forensically sound process, as mentioned in Section 2.3.1.
These visualization methods can provide an overview of all the data for convenient
navigation, but it is necessary for these methods to be provide some granularity and
filters based on a property.
2.4.1 Commercial Tools
Tassone, et al. [16] provides a list of popular commercial forensic tools. The study
selected tools based on the following criteria:
1. Commercial because open source software are not liable for any inconsistencies.
2. Used in at least one court transcript and/or officially provided to a government
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agency for use in criminal investigations.
3. Provide a visualization method.
4. Its forms of visualization are public knowledge.
Based on these criteria, Tassone, et al. [16] identified the following forensic tools:
• Nuix: Visual Analytics (Nuix)
• Micro Systemation: XAMN/XRY (XAMN)
• Cellbrite’s UFED Link Analysis (UFED)
• EnCase Analytics (EnCase)
• Oxygen Forensic Suite 2015 Analyst (Oxygen)
• Katana Forensics Lantern (Katana)
• Susteen Secure View 3 (Susteen)
• Forensic Toolkit FTK AccessData (FTK)
• Internet Evidence Finder IEF Magnet Forensics (IEF)
• Intalla Vound (Intella)
• i2 Analysts Notebook by IBM (i2)
XAMN, UFED, EnCase, Susteen, FTK, IEF, and Intella all provide timelines as
a method of visualization. Timelines can fulfill all the evaluation criteria mentioned
in Section 2.3.2, which include repeatablity, lucidity, anomaly detection, filterable,
and granularity. But these tools do not provide high-level abstraction of events and
instead provide artifacts as is and with limited temporal information, which can lead
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to information overload. They utilize various search capabilities such as time range
or keyword searches to help combat this issue, but without the correlation of related
events, these searches still suffer from having to sort through a quagmire of artifacts.
As a base, this study looks to utilize a timeline as its visualization method because
many popular commercial forensic tools employ this technique and has the potential
to meet the requirements for a forensically sound process.
2.4.2 Open Source Tools
There are debates about whether open source tools provides evidence that is
admissible in court. Tassone, et al. [16] focused its study on commercial tools because
open source software was not liable for inconsistencies, which runs into the issue of
evidence produced by the open source tools being reliable. Section 2.1.2 explains
the presentation phase is based on the legal environment of where the evidence is
being presented. Before looking at the visualization methods of various open source
tools, this study looks at the legal admissibility of evidence produced by such tools.
Though the presentation phase is not the technical piece of digital forensics, it is still
necessary to consider because all the effort placed into producing the evidence is null
if it cannot be admissible in trial.
2.4.2.1 Admissibility
Scientific evidence must pass the “Daubert Test” in order to be admissible in a
United States legal proceeding. This means the evidence must be both relevant and
reliable. The judge determines “whether the underlying methodology and technique
used to identify the evidence was sound and the evidence is reliable [17].” The test
uses the following categories when assessing the reliability of a scientific procedure:
• Testing: Can and has the procedure been tested?
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• Error Rate: Is there a known error rate of the procedure?
• Publication: Has the procedure been published and subject to peer review?
• Acceptance: Is the procedure generally accepted in the relevant scientific com-
munity? [17]
Based on these categories, Carrier [17] states open source tools are actually more
reliable than closed source commercial tools. The open source forensic tools provides
its source code to all, allowing for increased scrutiny in all categories. Carrier ar-
gues that for the acceptance guideline, closed source tools were accepted based on
non-procedural factors such as interface and support because it did not disclose its
procedures. The developers of the commercial tools cited the large number of user
they had as a way to get around this category of the admissibility test [18]. Open
source tools on the other hand provide its procedures allowing for the digital forensics
community to evaluate it and choose whether or not to accept or reject them.
Carrier offers a balanced solution that takes into account the commercial interests
of forensic tool development. Carrier [19] and Carrier, et al. [20] splits tools into two
main categories, extraction and presentation. Extraction tools process data and ex-
tract a subset, while presentation tools arrange the data from an extraction tool into a
useful format [17]. There are tools that provide both capabilities while others provide
one role. Carrier presents a solution where extraction tools are open source so inves-
tigators can verify the output while the presentation tools remain closed source. The
source code for the open source extraction tools allow the digital forensics community
to properly validate the procedures used to produce digital evidence.
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2.4.2.2 Popular Open Source/Free Forensic Media Imaging Tools
There are many open source forensic tools available as of 2019. As mentioned in
Section 2.4.2.1, most of these tools are split into extraction tools and presentation
tools.
The popular forensic imaging tools are FTK Imager, Linux “dd” and IXImager.
FTK Imager allows the examiner to create an exact replica of the drive, allowing
them to view deleted files. It also brings the capability to mount forensic images to
view its contents and file structure in the FTK Imager browser [21]. Linux “dd” is
a tool that comes with most Linux distributions. The tool creates drive duplications
and can also send data streams over the network. But examiners need to be careful
with this tool because it can also provides other capabilities, such as filling a drive
with random data, and has the potential to destroy evidence[22]. IXImager is a tool
developed by the U.S. Treasury Department IRS Criminal Investigation Electronic
Crimes Program, tested by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
and made to meet Law Enforcement requirements for digital media acquisition. “IX-
imager supports imaging devices which cannot otherwise be imaged in a Windows
environment, including notebooks and server RAID systems. It supports hot swap-
pable and plug-n-play devices such as, tape drives, USB and Firewire devices, as well
as SCSI, IDE and fiber channel [23]”
Popular open source analysis tools include SANS Investigative Forensic Toolkit
(SIFT) and Sleuth Kit/Autopsy. SIFT is an ”open source incident response and
forensic tool suite” created off an Ubuntu LTS 16.04 Base. It supports a large variety
of file systems, from standards such as NTFS, HFS+, and FAT16/32 all the way to
vmdk. The suite includes various open source tools such as log2timeline (for timeline
visualization), Plaso, Autopsy and Sleuth Kit, and Volatility (a memory analysis
tool) [24]. Oxygen (the free version) and Digital Evidence and Forensics Toolkit
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Zero (DEFT) are popular free forensic tools as well. DEFT is very similar to SIFT
which offers various tools in its suite and is a Linux Distribution. It includes Digital
Advanced Response Toolkit (DART) which contains various open source and closed
source Windows applications for live forensic analysis and incident response [25].
2.5 The Sleuth Kit and Autopsy
The Sleuth Kit (TSK) is a collection of command line tools for forensic analysis of
disk images. It’s core functionality is to “analyze volume and file system data [26].”
Autopsy provides a graphical interface to TSK and various other forensic tools.
2.5.1 TSK
TSK’s interesting feature is its plug-in framework that allows examiners to incor-
porate additional modules created by the open source community. TSK focuses on
volume and file systems and produces information about files. The examiner must
then use various tools with different interfaces to analyze the data at the application
layer [26]. Because there are so many different file types and analysis techniques, with
new ones developed everyday, it is impossible to have one tool that is a solution to
all. TSK provides an open platform for modules to operate.
“The Sleuth Kit provides a plug-in framework that makes it
easier to build end-to-end digital forensics solutions.” [26]
TSK’s framework documents provide detail specifics of how it operates, but the
basics start with the design philosophy of the framework. The analysis process is split
into the following three phases and illustrated in Figure 5:
• File Extraction: Files identified through file system data, carving, and other
data recovery techniques.
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• File Analysis: Each file analyzed individually through the pipeline
• Post-Processing: Results of analyzed individual files combined with analysis
of entire image.
Communication between the modules within the framework is handled by the
blackboard. It is a collection of artifacts which are associated to a file. And each of
these artifacts contain a collection of name-value pairs called attributes [28]. Each
file has various artifact types associated to it. TSK’s framework provides a set of
standard artifact types, such as TSK GEN INFO (which groups attributes that are
related to the file but not to each other in any way). Module developers are able to
create new artifact types if necessary, which require a unique type name and display
name that does not have to be unique. TSK’s framework also provides standard
attribute types, which consists of a unique type name and a display name that does
not have to be unique. Module developers are also able to create new attribute types
as needed. These name-value pairs are closely related to its associated artifact. For
Figure 5: The Sleuth Kit’s Analysis Process Framework [27].
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example, each individual log entry in a log file would be its own unique artifact, with
the same artifact type, and each of these entries would have a collection of attributes
such as date/time created associated to the artifacts. Figure 6 provides an illustration
of the blackboard concept.
TSK’s framework comes with several standard modules such as HashCalcMod-
ule, which calculates MD5 and SHA1 hashes for files. The standard tool TSK uses
currently is tsk analyseimg, which is a command line tool that loads a disk image
into SQLite and runs various pipelines on each file [27]. The standard modules that
come with TSK are rudimentary to what forensic tools are capable of because TSK
is meant to be further developed through the open-source community, which leads us
to Autopsy.
2.5.2 Autopsy
Autopsy is an open source digital forensics tool that uses TSK’s framework and
additional modules. The following are Autopsy’s current features, taken from their
documentation web page [29]:
• Multi-User Cases: Collaborate with fellow examiners on large cases.
Figure 6: The Sleuth Kit’s Blackboard [28].
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• Timeline Analysis: Displays system events in a graphical interface to help
identify activity.
• Keyword Search: Text extraction and index searched modules enable you to
find files that mention specific terms and find regular expression patterns.
• Web Artifacts: Extracts web activity from common browsers to help identify
user activity.
• Registry Analysis: Uses RegRipper to identify recently accessed documents
and USB devices.
• LNK File Analysis: Identifies short cuts and accessed documents
• Email Analysis: Parses MBOX format messages, such as Thunderbird.
• EXIF: Extracts geo location and camera information from JPEG files.
• File Type Sorting: Group files by their type to find all images or documents.
• Media Playback: View videos and images in the application and not require
an external viewer.
• Thumbnail Viewer: Displays thumbnail of images to help quick view pictures.
• Robust File System Analysis: Support for common file systems, including
NTFS, FAT12/FAT16/FAT32/ExFAT, HFS+, ISO9660 (CD-ROM), Ext2/Ext3/Ext4,
Yaffs2, and UFS from The Sleuth Kit.
• Hash Set Filtering: Filter out known good files using NSRL and flag known
bad files using custom hashsets in HashKeeper, md5sum, and EnCase formats.
• Tags: Tag files with arbitrary tag names, such as ’bookmark’ or ’suspicious’,
and add comments.
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• Unicode Strings Extraction: Extracts strings from unallocated space and
unknown file types in many languages (Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, etc.).
• File Type Detection: based on signatures and extension mismatch detection.
• Interesting Files Module: Flags files and folders based on name and path.
• Android Support: Extracts data from SMS, call logs, contacts, Tango, Words
with Friends, and more.
Autopsy is able to support either raw/dd images or E01 format. Many of Au-
topsy’s features stem from TSK’s modules, such as its registry analysis and hash set
filtering.
2.5.2.1 Timeline Analysis
Its feature of interest for this research is the timeline analysis, which utilizes
timeline visualization to display results from the various modules used to analyze the
disk image. The timeline pulls timestamps from files, web artifacts, and other data
sets such as EXIF and GPS [30]. It provides two different timeline visualizations, a
bar chart that displays the amount of data occurring in a given time frame, similar
to a histogram and shown in Figure 7, and a timeline with detailed events, shown in
Figure 8. Figure 8 includes criterion three mentioned in Section 2.3.2 and implements
filterable attributes.
digital forensics timelines can overwhelm examiners with the amount of data they
display. Autopsy’s timeline visualization aims to alleviate the issue by allowing the
events to be filtered not just by time, but also based on type, such as file system,
web activity, or miscellaneous, which includes messages, GPS routes, location history,
email, and more. Figure 9 shows the complete list.
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Figure 7: Autopsy’s Timeline [30].
Figure 8: Autopsy’s Timeline [30].
Autopsy also groups similar events together to help prevent data overload. For
example, it will cluster events from the same folder into a single event or URLS from
the same domain are shown as a single event [30]. The examiner can zoom in to learn
more details about the events, which covers the granular aspect mentioned in Section
2.3.2. The timeline is also filterable using keywords, which is detailed in the next
section.
26
Figure 9: Timeline Filters.
Autopsy eventually hopes to integrate Plaso, another open source digital forensics
tool for timeline generation. But currently, its documentation states more research is
required because their method of clustering to prevent data overload does not work
for possible arbitrary input types from Plaso. This is because the Autopsy’s timeline
generation is hard coded for the input types Autopsy produces, but eventually hopes
to develop “ more advanced clustering approach though so that we can leverage the
parsing support from Plaso [30].” More about Plaso and its uses are explained in
Section 2.6.1.
2.5.2.2 Keyword Search and Indexing
Autopsy uses Apache SOLR as the engine behind the keyword search features.
Examiners can use pre-defined keyword lists or ad-hoc keyword searches and can be
run directly either during or after the ingest process of the image. Apache SOLR
also allows for regular expressions. All files containing text that Autopsy discovers
is indexed into a SOLR database, where its text is extracted using Tika and other
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libraries. The actual keyword and regular expression searches are done over this
text index [31]. Apache SOLR allows files to be indexed via JSON, XML, CVS, or
binary over HTTP and users can retrieve the results via HTTP GET. The results are
returned in either JSON, XML, CSV, or binary format [32].
2.6 Custom Forensic Tool
Two tools developed to address the timeline clustering issue are Property Graph
Event Reconstruction (PGER) and Temporal Analysis Integration Management Ap-
plication (TAIMA).
2.6.1 Property Graph Event Reconstruction
PGER abstracts user actions on digital media. ”Ontological data representation
and data normalization can provide a structured way to correlate digital artifacts
[33].” Though this reduces the amount of data an examiner sorts through, the tradi-
tional method of ontology data processing requires large amounts of disk space and
incurs high computational costs. PGER provides a solution by reducing the compu-
tational costs of processing events from a disk image by storing the data extracted
into a native graph database, Neo4j, that improves query speeds.
2.6.1.1 Data Extraction
From the digital forensics process, it first extracts data using two different tools,
Plaso or Temporal Event Abstraction and Reconstruction (TEAR). TEAR uses al-
gorithms and pattern matching to help identify high-level events [34]. It is a C++
program that creates various CSV files by extracting artifacts from a disk image. The
artifacts’ data sources are from the file table, registry, and Windows events as well as
Chrome and Firefox history [33].
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Plaso on the other hand is a Python-based engine for log2timeline [35]. log2timeline
extracts timestamps from the disk image, its partitions and volume shadow copies,
and combines them into a unique data storage. Plaso then adds psort, which converts
the unique Plaso data storage into an Elasticsearch database.
2.6.1.2 Graph Conversion
PGER converts the extracted data into Neo4j, a native graph database. Depend-
ing on what tool was utilized for the data extraction step, it uses two different tools
for graph conversions. If the data was extracted using Plaso and the events are placed
in an Elastic database, PGER requires logstash to convert the events into various sub-
graphs stored in Neo4j. If TEAR was utilized, PGER uses a custom Python script
to convert the events. [33] explains the graph conversion process is dictated by the
event type. Plaso stores its event type in parser field while TEAR identifies its event
type in the filename. Based on these, different profiles and filters can be applied
to properly parse the event data, allowing the user to pick which events appear in
Neo4j. This allows the examiner to focus on a small set of relevant events rather than
sorting through the entire image. PGER creates various object nodes for filenames
of extracted artifacts, action nodes for specific actions taken at the timestamps, and
parser nodes that explain the data’s source of information. All of these nodes are
related to each other through timestamps. This saves on the computational costs;
for example, there is one parser node created for all the events extracted from the
Windows Registry, instead of a parser node being created for each extracted registry
event. Each of the registry events will have its own unique object node connected
to the one parser node. But these artifacts are differentiated by the different action
nodes (with a timestamp property) created that are connected to the object and
parser nodes. The action nodes are also related to each other through a time tree, to
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make it easier to find relationships occurring in a specified time frame.
2.6.2 Temporal Analysis Integration Management Application
TAIMA [36] is an application built using a full stack development platform called
GRANDstack. GRANDstack includes GraphQL, React, Apollo, and Neo4j [37].
GraphQL is a language for building Application Program Interface (API)s to query
application data as a graph. It allows the developers to define types and avail-
able queries, allowing the user to only request data necessary. React, developed by
Facebook, is a JavaScript library for building an interactive user interface (UI). The
back-end database GRANDstack uses is Neo4j, a NoSQL, native open source graph
database that allows developers to store and query data as a graph. Neo4j allows for
complex graph travels using its Cypher query language, rather than an index search
that comes with a traditional SQL database. Lastly, GRANDstack uses Apollo to
interact with GraphQL. Apollo Client is used on the frontend to package queries into
a GraphQL query and the server side GraphQL API is able to translate such requests.
Figure 10 provides an illustrative overview of the full stack.
2.6.2.1 Data Abstraction
TAIMA creates high-level events based on specific predetermined logic using Cypher
query searches. It creates abstracted events for program installation, power events
for startup and shutdown, program executions, file downloads, and web history [36].
Each of these abstraction events are created from the events extracted using PGER.
It searches the graph for specific object and parser node relationships connected to
each other by action nodes. When all three are found, TAIMA creates a new high-
level abstraction node describing the event in more human readable format, such as
“Program Installation” or “System Startup”.
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Figure 10: GRANDstack Architecture [38].
2.6.2.2 Timeline Visualization
TAIMA uses React to develop a UI for the examiners to interact with. Currently it
allows the high-level abstraction nodes to be filtered based on a time range as shown in
Figure 11. React allows TAIMA to enable tooltips, accessed by mousing over an event,
which displays the abstracted events source. For example, for a “System Uptime
Report, Event Log Service Started” abstraction event, mousing over it displays its
source as “EventLog/6013 and EventLog/6005”. TAIMA is also able to interactively
filter the time range displayed depending on the level zoom. This allows the examiners
to search a time frame of interest and zoom in on areas with clusters of activities for
increased scrutiny.
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Figure 11: TAIMA Timeline [36].
2.6.3 Neo4j Full-Text Index
Both [36] and [33] explain Neo4j and its capabilities well but do not talk about
Neo4j’s full-text search index capabilities as it is a newer feature introduced with
Neo4j version 3.5. Neo4j’s full-text index is powered by Apache Lucene and sup-
ports various features such as “indexing of both nodes and relationships, can be
queried using Lucene query language or Cypher procedures, kept up to date au-
tomatically as nodes and relationships are added, removed, or updated, and can
support any number of documents in a single index.” [39]. Neo4j will tokenize the
indexed string values, allowing the database to match within the contents of in-
dexed string properties, and does not require a literal string match [39]. The full-
text search index can be created using a simple Cypher procedure such as “CALL
db.index.fulltext.createNodeIndex(“nameOfIndex”, [“nodeLabel”, “anotherNodeLa-
bel”], [“indexedProperty”, “anotherIndexedProperty”]”. In this example, Neo4j will
consider any nodes labeled as “nodeLabel” and/or “anotherNodeLabel” and search
them for the two properties mentioned in the next argument. Those properties and
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the strings it contains would be indexed. It is important to note Neo4j will index
any nodes with the one or both labels and if they have values in one or both of the
properties specified. Because this index is powered by Lucene, it supports wildcard,
regular expression, fuzzy, and proximity searches as well as boolean terms.
2.7 Summary
This chapter went over the various common phases involved in digital forensics,
which were pre-process, acquisition and preservation, analysis, presentation, and post-
process. It then went over information visualization and how it improves examiners
efficiency with conducting digital forensics. The chapter looked into the four rules of
a forensic computing as well as the various evaluation criteria for forensic soundness.
It also went over the different popular forensic tools and how their employment of
visualization timelines were lacking. Lastly, the chapter reviewed the features within
in Neo4j’s full-text index, the data abstraction done with PGER, and TAIMA’s in-
formation visualization methods.
33
III. Integration
3.1 Overview
The purpose of this study is to reduce the human analysis portion of a digital
forensics examination. Current practices involve string searches to identify potential
evidentiary items, then taking them through various steps to determine its eviden-
tiary value. The research looks to combine the string searching capabilities that
initiate an investigation with automated correlation and abstraction logic to further
streamline this process. Event Correlation and Abstraction Timeline Visualization
(ECATV) uses the output of Autopy’s keyword search ingest and combines it with the
automated correlation capabilities of Property Graph Event Reconstruction (PGER)
and the user interface of Temporal Analysis Integration Management Application
(TAIMA) to provide a more complete tool. Autopsy has a timeline, as mentioned in
Section 2.5.2.1 but its features are essentially a histogram or the same information
generated by various Autopsy modules placed on a timeline. It provides an easier
view of which artifacts occurred when but still suffers from information overload is-
sues. The automated correlation helps reduce the number of events on a timeline
while maintaining accuracy and the abstraction logic takes the concept a step further
by collecting similar events that occurred at the same timestamp.
The overall design of ECATV is described below and is further broken down into
the details of its ingest process as well as its user interface. It is assumed that the
evidence and data was obtained through a forensically sound process described in
Chapter 2. This study is more focused on the analysis phase of the process. The
study also processed and analyzed Windows images as this is the more prevalent
operating system and continues on the research of [36] and [33].
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3.2 Design
ECATV includes the capabilities of many tools using the benefits discovered by
Adderley [36] and Schelkoph [33] to create a granular and filterable visual timeline.
The full design concept can be split between the ingest phase and the user interface
(UI). The ingest phase contains the bulk of the behind-the-scenes processing of taking
a raw, physical image and converting its artifacts into a form that provides examiners
with relevant information faster than a traditional database with key-value pairs,
such as Figure 12. The traditional database is a double-edged sword that provides a
plethora of information which will eventually be necessary during an examination but
at the same time overloads the examiner making it difficult to find a place to start.
It also provides a poor overview of user(s) activity within the image. ECATV aims
to resolve these issues by using the abstraction methods in [33] and the visualization
method of a timeline used in [36] but also maintaining the value traditional databases
provide.
Figure 12: Autopsy Example.
3.2.1 Tools
The tools involved in ECATV are:
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• Disk Imager: Specifically used AccessData’s FTK Imager.
• Temporal Event Abstraction and Reconstruction (TEAR): A custom
tool developed by Okolica to extract artifacts [34].
• Plaso: Another tool to extract artifacts and timestamps.
• The Sleuth Kit (TSK)/Autopsy: A digital forensics software for image
analysis.
• Neo4j: A native graph database.
• GraphQL: API to interface with Neo4j.
• Apollo: Integrates GraphQL with React.
• React: Used to develop front-end UI.
• docker: [33] developed various containers to compartmentalize its process.
3.2.2 Integration Process
ECATV used FTK Imager to create raw dd images for its Windows hard drives.
As mentioned earlier, evidence acquisition is not the focus of this study and it is
assumed examiners have their own method of acquiring images. ECATV will work
regardless of the acquisition tool as long as the images are a raw physical copy. The
next step is to process the images through TEAR and Plaso. The extracted artifacts
are then placed into Neo4j using specific filters to create various sub graphs of various
events within the image. These sub graphs consist of action, parser, time, and object
nodes, as illustrated in Figure 13. Schelkoph [33] explains the time nodes are a unix
time stamp and represents when the action occurred. The action node contains the
description of the action that affects the digital object. The object node is a digital
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object identified by a URL, file path, registry key, log event, or some other object.
Finally the parser node contains the origin of the information. Then Cypher queries,
Neo4j’s graph query language, are used to create high-level abstracted events, similar
to ones in [36].
Figure 13: Neo4j Subgraph [33].
Autopsy’s keyword search module is used to discover artifacts containing keywords
from an examiner’s pre-defined list. The high-level abstract events that contain the
artifacts associated to the keywords are linked to the same keywords within Neo4j.
This is done by adding a new searchKeyword property to the abstraction nodes in
the Neo4j database. Finally a text index is created on the searchKeyword property to
allow for text searches within the graph database. The ingest phase of ECATV creates
the final back-end database the timeline visualization uses to query and display its
data. ECATV uses a modified UI from [36], allowing examiners to analyze the high-
level events from the image, sorted by a user specified time range. The examiner can
then further filter this timeline view with desired text searches. Figure 14 provides
an overview of the entire process.
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Figure 14: ECATV Flow Chart.
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3.3 Ingest
The ingest phase of the process can be split into two parts. The first part involves
extracting the events of a raw physical image. Then this data is transformed and
packaged into a form that makes use of Neo4j’s native graph database capabilities.
ECATV makes use of the research done by Schelkoph [33] and adapts its tools to do
so.
The second part involves using outputs from Neo4j and applying abstraction logic
to further the robustness of this database. The abstraction logic are adaptations of
Adderley’s research [36]. Lastly, it uses the outputs from Autopy’s keyword search
module to identify objects associated to specific keywords, helping set the groundwork
for a keyword filterable timeline.
3.3.1 Phase One of Ingest
PGER utilizes docker containers to build its native graph database. A “Docker
container image is a lightweight, standalone, executable package of software that
includes everything needed to run an application: code, runtime, system tools, system
libraries and settings.”[40] Docker containers are essentially packaged software that
allows code to be packaged into a single unit and allows applications to be run from
one computing environment to another. Because of this, ECATV was able to pick
and choose the containers necessary to build the graph database and cut down on the
processing time rather than processing an image through PGER’s entirety. ECATV
used containers “elasticDB”, “plaso”, and “neo4jInput”.
The elasticDB container contained code setting up the ELK Stack. The ELK stack
contains Elasticsearch, Kibana, Beats, and Logstash [41]. Elasticsearch is the “heart”
of the ELK Stack and centrally stores the data produced by Plaso. Kibana is a front-
end graphical UI that allows the users to easily view the data in the Elasticsearch
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database. Finally, logstash is the data-processing pipeline that ingests data from
sources, transform the data through the use of filters, and outputs the new data into
a database. The elasticDB container set up the environment for Plaso to input the
data produced by log2timeline, mentioned in Section 2.6.1.1, into an Elasticserach
database through psort. Once Plaso processed the image, this study examined the
contents of Elasticsearch to determine how to configure the filters of logstash to
identify the necessary data and to transform said data for Neo4j. Figure 15 shows
an example of how Plaso extracted a Windows Eventlog artifact from the image and
placed it into the Elasticsearch database.
Figure 15: Plaso Example.
The last container, neo4jInput, handled the process of taking the data from the
Elasticsearch database, changing its format, and placing it into a Neo4j database out-
put, all through the logstash pipeline. The filters queried the Elasticsearch database
for specific instances and transformed its output into various Cypher queries utilized
to create new nodes in Neoj or update existing ones with new properties and/or re-
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lationships to complete the various subgraphs like the one in Figure 13. Figure 16 is
an example filter used to find various artifacts within the Elasticsearch database that
Plaso extracted using the parser “lnk”. These events show when link shortcut files,
pointing to an executable file, were accessed within the Windows image. Figure 17
shows an example of this filter’s end result. It created one parser node in the Neo4j
database, containing the parserName property with a value of the string “lnk”. This
node was associated to all the different action nodes with the properties, “action”
and “timestamp”. Each action node represented a different entry within the Elastic-
search database that was extracted with Plaso’s “lnk” parser. Each of these action
nodes were also associated to an object node, containing the file path of the shortcut
accessed. If the same shortcut was accessed multiple instances throughout the image,
the filter only created one distinct object node but associated it to various action
nodes which were distinguishable by the different timestamps.
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1   if [parser] == "lnk" {
2   #complete standard parameters: filename, parser, and action
3   translate {
4   add_field => {
5   "[statement1][parameters][objProps][filename]" => "%{filename}"
6   "[statement1][parameters][parserProps][parserName]" => "%{parser}"
7   }
8   field => "timestamp_desc"
9   destination => "[statement1][parameters][actProps][action]"
10   dictionary => [ "Creation Time", "Link Created",
11   "Content Modification Time", "Link Modified",
12   "Last Access Time", "Link Accessed"
13   ]
14   fallback => "Unknown Action: %{timestamp_desc}"
15   }
16   #create queries and properties to link obj to link target
17   if [link_target] {
18   #find the target of the linkfile
19   grok { match => { "link_target" => [ "%{GREEDYDATA}? %{PATH:linkTarget}",
20   "%{GREEDYDATA:linkTarget}" ] } }
21   #change link target path to match filestat (TSK)
22   mutate { gsub => [ "linkTarget", "^.*:", "", "linkTarget", "[\\]", "/" ] }
23   
24   mutate {
25   add_field => {
26   "[statement1][parameters][lnkTgtProps][filename]" => "%{linkTarget}"
27   "ss4" => "MERGE (lnkTgt:object {filename: $lnkTgtProps.filename}) ON CREATE SET 
lnkTgt=$lnkTgtProps"
28   "ss5" => "MERGE (obj)-[:TARGET]->(lnkTgt)"
29   }
30   }
31   #update statement1 to add the new queries
32   mutate {
33   update => { "[statement1][statement]" => "%{[statement1][statement]} %{ss4} 
%{ss5}" }
34   }
35   }
36   }
Figure 16: LNK Filter [33].
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Figure 17: Neo4j LNK Example.
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The dd image was then processed through TEAR, the custom tool developed
by Okolica [34]. This C++ program extracted data such as Windows Event Logs,
prefetch instances, Windows Registry information, and various Windows user data.
The information was then collected and placed into various text files in CSV format.
Figure 18 show an example of the Windows Event Log data collected from the image
using TEAR. Logstash was used again to transform the collected events from TEAR
into Cypher queries for Neo4j. Figure 19 shows the filter utilized for Windows Event
Log data.
Figure 18: EventLog Txt.
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1   if [path] =~ /.*eventlog\.txt/ {
2   mutate { gsub => [ "message", "\t", "|", "message", '"', "'" ] }
3   csv {
4   separator => "|"
5   columns => [
6   "TimeGenerated",
7   "EventID",
8   "SourceName",
9   "Message"
10   ]
11   }
12   if [TimeGenerated] {
13   mutate {
14   add_field => {
15   "[statement1][parameters][objProps][filename]" => "%{SourceName}/%{EventID}"
16   "[statement1][parameters][parserProps][parserName]" => "eventLog"
17   "[statement1][parameters][actProps][message]" => "%{Message}"
18   }
19   }
20   ruby { code => '
21   timeStr = event.get("TimeGenerated")
22   timeInt = (Time.strptime(timeStr, "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S").to_i + 25200) * 1000
23   event.set("[statement1][parameters][actProps][timestamp]", timeInt)
24   '
25   }
26   if [SourceName] == "Microsoft-Windows-Winlogon" {
27   translate {
28   field => "[EventID]"
29   destination => "[statement1][parameters][actProps][action]"
30   dictionary => [
31   "7001", "Logon CEI Notification",
32   "7002", "Logoff CEI Notification"
33   ]
34   fallback => "Unknown Action: %{EventID}"
35   }
36   }
37   else if [SourceName] == "EventLog" {
38   translate {
39   field => "[EventID]"
40   destination => "[statement1][parameters][actProps][action]"
41   dictionary => [
42   "6006", "Event Log Service Stopped",
43   "6009", "Windows Version",
44   "6005", "Event Log Service Started",
45   "6013", "System Uptime Report",
46   "6011", "Computer Name Changed"
47   ]
48   fallback => "Unknown Action: %{EventID}"
49   }
50   }
51   else if [SourceName] == "e1iexpress" {
52   translate {
53   field => "[EventID]"
54   destination => "[statement1][parameters][actProps][action]"
55   dictionary => [
56   "32", "Network Interface Connected",
57   "27", "Network Interface Disconnected"
58   ]
59   fallback => "Unknown Action: %{EventID}"
60   }
61   }
62   else if [SourceName] == "Microsoft-Windows-Power-Troubleshooter" {
63   translate {
64   field => "[EventID]"
65   destination => "[statement1][parameters][actProps][action]"
66   dictionary => [
Figure 19: EventLog Filter.
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67   "1", "System Returned from Low Power State"
68   ]
69   fallback => "Unknown Action: %{EventID}"
70   }
71   }
72   else if [SourceName] == "Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager" {
73   translate {
74   field => "[EventID]"
75   destination => "[statement1][parameters][actProps][action]"
76   dictionary => [
77   "10000", "Starting Session",
78   "10001", "Ending Session",
79   "10002", "Shutting Down Application"
80   ]
81   fallback => "Unknown Action: %{EventID}"
82   }
83   }
84   else if [SourceName] == "MsiInstaller" {
85   translate {
86   field => "[EventID]"
87   destination => "[statement1][parameters][actProps][action]"
88   dictionary => [
89   "1040", "Beginning Install Transaction",
90   "11707", "Installation Completed",
91   "1033", "Install Info",
92   "1042", "Install Transaction Complete",
93   "1005", "Installer Initiated Restart"
94   ]
95   fallback => "Unknown Action: %{EventID}"
96   }
97   }
98   else { mutate { remove_field => [ "[statement1][parameters][objProps]" ] } }
99   }
100   }
Figure 19: EventLog Filter.
The filters again created subgraphs similar to Figure 17. Specific to the event
log filter, logstash created one parser node with an “eventLog” paserName property
and several action nodes, again distinguishable by timestamps. The properties from
the Event Log subgraphs were labeled and constructed differently because these log
events did not necessarily have, for example, a file path of the shortcut accessed such
as the LNK subgraphs mentioned earlier. Instead, the event log subgraphs created
object nodes with specific Windows Event Log IDs and action nodes with the Event
Log message along with the timestamps. Figure 20 shows an example of one entry
from events produced by TEAR, placed into the Neo4j database. The object nodes
for these subgraphs contained information of the log data’s origin, such as Microsoft
Windows Winlogon or Msi Installer logs.
46
Figure 20: EventLog Neo4j Subgraph.
Overall, phase one of the ingest process involved using Plaso and TEAR to extract
events from a Windows image and place them in their respective outputs, Elastic-
search database for Plaso and CSV format text files for TEAR. Then logstash is a
pipeline to accept as inputs these two difference sources of events, transform the data
into Cypher queries to create desired subgraphs, and insert the results into a Neo4j
database. ECATV created the same subgraphs in [33] but modified filters to correctly
convert the data from two different sources into Neo4j.
Two different sources were used to create a more robust database for the ab-
straction portion of the ingest phase. This was because TEAR captured events in a
different manner than Plaso and provided more information for certain events. For
example, Plaso extracted the Event Log artifacts from the image but was unable to
pull the actual message as shown in Figure 15. TEAR on the other-hand was able to
extract the source of the logs as well as the specific messages associated to each of
these events. So ECATV used logstash with Event Log filters that accepted TEAR
Event Log text files for its inputs. Meanwhile it used the LNK filters and used Plaso’s
extracted events to create the File Table subgraphs mentioned in [33]. It is important
to note, as mentioned earlier, all subgraphs were also related to time nodes, which
were important during the creation of high-level abstracted events in phase two of
ingest.
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3.3.2 Phase Two of Ingest
Phase Two involves applying the abstraction logic through Cypher queries to
the Neo4j database and creating high level abstracted nodes. Adderley [36] created
high level events for power events, installation information, program execution, file
download, and web history. ECATV follows the same concept and created the same
high-level events. These events were represented in Neo4j as new abstraction nodes.
Abstraction nodes were created by identifying and collecting multiple low level events
and collecting its properties to populate the abstraction nodes’ properties. For exam-
ple, for the installation information abstraction nodes, the query searched for various
object nodes containing the log entries 11707, 1042, and 1033 from the Msi Installer
logs. Msi Installer Event ID 11707 translated to “Successful installation”, Event ID
1042 translated “Notification of the installation process completion” and Event ID
1033 translated “Records the end result of a program installation. Status code 0
means the installation was successful” [36].
ECATV utilized similar queries to Adderley’s research, essentially looking for the
same low level events. The logic for creating Program Execution abstraction nodes
was overhauled due to the change in some of the subgraphs’ schema of the low level
events in Neo4j. Because both TEAR and Plaso were applied for ECATV, the Cypher
query required a significant change. Figure 21 contains the Cypher query used to
create the Program Execution abstraction nodes within ECATV’s Neo4j database.
Once these abstraction nodes were created, ECATV used Autopsy’s keyword
search module to locate files associated to keywords an examiner was interested in.
Autopsy ingested the files of the Windows images by extracting and indexing their
text into a SOLR database. This allowed for quick regular expression and keyword
searches across the image. The results of the searches were ultimately stored into a
SQL database, called autopsy.db, for the Autopsy “case” of the image. This database
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1   //Program Execution
2   MATCH (parser:parser)<-[:PARSER]-(act:action)-[:EFFECTS]->(obj:object)
3   WHERE parser.parserName = 'prefetch'
4   MATCH (act) -[:AT_TIME]->(sec:Second)
5   MATCH p = (sec) -[:NEXT *10]->()
6   WITH p
7   UNWIND nodes(p) AS secNodes
8   MATCH (secNodes)
<-[:AT_TIME]-(act:action)-[:EFFECTS]->(obj:object)-[:TARGET]->(obj2:object)
9   WITH act.timestamp as timestamp, COLLECT(DISTINCT obj.filename) as filenames,
collect(DISTINCT act) AS collection,
10   collect(DISTINCT obj) AS b, COLLECT(DISTINCT act.action ) AS acts, collect
(DISTINCT obj.title) as titles
11   WITH [event in filenames | (SPLIT(event, "/"))][0][2] as extractedValues, filenames,
acts, titles, timestamp, collection, b
12   CREATE (a:Abstraction{ Event: [extractedValues], Trace: filenames, Description: acts +
titles , timestamp:timestamp})
13   FOREACH (pair in collection | MERGE (pair)-[:LVL1_ABSTRACTION_LINK]->(a)
14   FOREACH (set in b | MERGE
(set)-[:LVL1_ABSTRACTION_LINK]->(a)))
Figure 21: Program Execution Cypher Query.
followed the same schema for module communication within TSK, called the black-
board (reference Section 2.5.1).
Autopsy stored the artifacts it discovered into the blackboard artifacts table
with attributes artifact id, obj id, artifact obj id, and artifact type id.
The artifact type id referenced the table blackboard artifact types with at-
tributes artifact type id, type name, and display name. Artifact type id nine
corresponded to type name of TSK KEYWORD HIT with a display name of Keyword
Hits. Once all the artifacts with artifact type id of nine were isolated within the
blackboard artifacts table, the next step was to examine the actual artifact id.
These values were connected to the blackboard attributes table with properties
artifact id, attribute type id, and value text. The value text attribute con-
tained the actual strings of the keywords or regular expressions the module searched
for. The attribute type id attribute was related to the
blackboard attribute types table which contained attributes of
attribute type id, type name and display name. The attribute type ids of in-
terest for this study were 10 and 11, which had type names of TSK KEYWORD and
TSK KEYWORD REGEXP respectively. The blackboard attributes table was then iso-
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lated for values 10 and 11 of the attribute type id to determine which search key-
words corresponded to which artifact. The last bit of necessary information was the
file paths of the actual keyword search hits. These resided in the tsk files table
with attributes obj id and various other attributes but the ones of interest were
name and parent path. The obj id values related to the same obj id values within
the blackboard artifacts table. The combination of the parent path value and
the name value within the tsk files table contained the full directory of the files
within the Windows image, associated to the keyword search hits. A Python script
was written to extract the necessary information of the search keywords with a hit
and its associated files. Figure 22 provides a relational overview of the various tables
within the Autopsy database.
TSK_FILES
obj_id: 3841
name: green
parent_path: /Users/
blackboard_artifacts
artifact_id: 9223372036854775742
obj_id: 3841
artifact_obj_id: 157366
artifact_type_id: 9
blackboard_artifact_types
artifact_type_id: 9
type_name: TSK_KEYWORD_HIT
display_name: Keyword Hits
blackboard_attributes
artifact_id: 9223372036854775742
artifact_type_id: 9
source: Keyword Search
attribute_type_id: 10
value_text: green
blackboard_attributes_types
attribute_type_id: 10
type_name: TSK_KEYWORD
display_name: Keyword
Figure 22: Autopsy Blackboard Communication.
This information then was integrated into Neo4j through a series of Cypher
queries. The queries first matched the object node associated to the file path. It
then searched for its corresponding abstraction node and added a searchKeyword
property with a string value of the original keyword used in the Autopsy Keyword
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Search Module. The base keyword was used as the value within this property and not
a series of its associated regular expressions because Neo4j’s text indexing features
already include regular expressions as a capability.
3.4 User Interface
ECATV uses a similar REACT timeline as TAIMA with a few modifications.
ECATV uses the same GraphQL API but with a modified schema. A new query type
was added to take into account the possible queries for search keywords. Figure 23
shows the abstraction schema that returns the same properties from Neo4j as TAIMA
did, but with the added searchKeyword property.
1   type abstraction {
2   startTime: Float!
3   endTime: Float!
4   Event: [String]
5   Trace: [String]
6   Description: [String]
7   timestamp: Float
8   searchKeyword: String
9   }
Figure 23: Abstraction Schema.
Figure 24 illustrates the actual queries that were made to Neo4j. The first query
remained the same as the one in TAIMA to account for examiners wanting the timeline
to return all events within the given time frame. The second query was added for
ECATV to query Neo4j’s database using its full text search capabilities mentioned in
Section 3.3.2. This query first pulled the nodes that successfully matched the keyword
search and returned only the nodes that also matched the examiner’s requested time
frame. It is also important to note that the second abstraction query now requires
a searchKeyword argument on top of the already required startTime and endTime
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arguments.
1   abstraction(startTime: Float!, endTime: Float!):
2   [abstraction] @cypher(statement:
3   "MATCH 
(:Second)<-[:AT_TIME]-(act:action)-[:LVL1_ABSTRACTION_LINK]->(abs:Abstraction)
4   WHERE abs.timestamp >= startTime AND abs.timestamp <= endTime with 
abs.timestamp as timestamp,
5   COLLECT (DISTINCT abs) AS abs 
6   UNWIND abs AS x
7   RETURN x"
8   )
1   abstractionSearch(startTime: Float!, endTime: Float!, searchKeyword: String):
2   [abstraction] @cypher(statement:
3   "CALL db.index.fulltext.queryNodes('keyword', searchKeyword)
4   YIELD node as y
5   MATCH 
(:Second)<-[:AT_TIME]-(act:action)-[:LVL1_ABSTRACTION_LINK]->(abs:Abstraction)
6   WHERE abs.timestamp >= startTime AND abs.timestamp <= endTime AND abs.Trace = 
y.Trace
7   WITH abs.timestamp as timestamp,
8   COLLECT (DISTINCT abs) AS abs 
9   UNWIND abs AS x
10   RETURN x"
11   )
Figure 24: Abstraction Queries.
The resolver function in charge of translating GraphQL queries into a Cypher
query was also modified to account for the new query, as shown in Figure 25. The
other parts of the UI such as the viewing transformation, rendering, and visual display
components of ECATV remained largely the same as TAIMA [36]. A text box was
added to the visual display component for examiners to submit the desired search
keyword.
1   export const resolvers = {
2   Query: {
3   object: neo4jgraphql,
4   Second: neo4jgraphql,
5   abstraction: neo4jgraphql,
6   abstractionSearch: neo4jgraphql
7   }
8   }
Figure 25: Resolver Function.
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3.5 Summary
ECATV’s ingest process involves multiple tools and combines their capabilities
into a single entity. The process goes from a raw physical image of a Windows
machine to a timeline visualization that maps out user and system activity over a
specified time period. The image was processed through TEAR where its output is
placed into CSV formatted text files. It was also processed through Plaso and the
events were placed into an Elasticsearch database. All these events were processed
through logstash where the pipeline’s filters transformed the information into Cypher
statements for a Neo4j database. These statements created various subgraphs consist-
ing of action, object, parser, and time nodes. The Neo4j database was supplemented
with additional abstraction logic in the form of Cypher statements to connect a col-
lection of low-level events into a high-level event. These abstraction nodes were also
supplemented with the results of Autopsy’s Keyword Search Module and added a new
searchKeyword property to the abstraction nodes. These properties were indexed us-
ing Neo4j’s fulltext search feature and allowed the timeline to conduct string searches.
ECATV allows examiner to visualize the user and system activities across a specified
time period, similar to TAIMA, while also allowing the examiner to further filter to
results down to specific search keywords, such as a user name. The new feature allows
examiner to filter the results, for example, down to the events of a single user, a spe-
cific program, or a user’s association to a specific program. It also provides examiners
with the high-level events’ trace, allowing them to closely examine the potential items
of evidence through Autopsy or other digital forensics tool.
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IV. ECATV and Digital Forensics Examination Process
This chapter presents how the Event Correlation and Abstraction Timeline Visual-
ization (ECATV)’s effectiveness was assessed. The next section explains the different
phases in the common digital forensics examination process. Then it explains the
three user stories that were selected to test ECATV. Lastly, it walks through how
ECATV can be used and how it fits within the digital forensics process. Scenario one
was selected for the initial walkthrough because it was the same scenario used in the
Adderley’s user study [36] and due to the differences explained in Section 4.3.
4.1 Assessment
The previous chapter discussed the process of taking a physical image all the
way to a timeline visualization with an added keyword search capability. Keyword
search was added to provide examiners with a method to reduce the number of events
displayed on the timeline and allow the user to control what he or she desired.
Evaluation of ECATV consist of use cases for three different images to measure
its capabilities in the current digital investigation process. First it tested whether or
not this process was viable in creating the desired timeline with the high level events
and search keywords for a different data set. The details of the three images and the
scenarios for each were outlined in the next section “User Stories”. Though ECATV
was researched with the data agnostic concept in mind, it is currently limited to
Windows images as many of the rules, logic, and filters developed were targeted for
the Windows operating system. The measurement is ECATV’s accuracy in presenting
the necessary pieces of information for each scenario. This was done to provide a
more objective measure of its viability as an operational module. The many benefits
of a timeline were difficult to measure as there are many subjective categories and
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its usability as an investigative tool would rely on the examiners’ level of ability in
conducting digital forensics. But [36] conducted a user study confirming the usability
benefits of a timeline visualization. Thus it was necessary to test ECATV on a more
objective level before continuing with an updated usability test.
4.2 Common Digital Forensics Examination Process
Carrier [42] breaks down a digital forensics investigation into three phases; digital
crime scene preservation and documentation, digital evidence searching and documen-
tation, and digital event reconstruction and documentation. The first phase pertains
to imaging and preserving the original copy and is not the focus of this study. The
focus is on finding evidence which partially overlaps into the third phase, recon-
struction. Documentation standards differ based on legal requirements of where the
investigation was conducted and again is not the focus.
Carrier explains the evidence searching phase, or the digital forensics examination
process, is broken down into four phases. Phase one is target definition used to
locate evidence, such as a specific file name or content within a file. This is the
most challenging aspect and targets are “defined from either experience or existing
evidence” [42]. The examiners use their experience from similar investigations to
define common targets. They can also derive additional targets from the evidence they
already discovered during the examination. The second phase involves data extraction
and interpretation. Once the target is defined, investigators conduct a search of the
digital crime scene for evidence through interpretation of different abstraction layers.
Carrier explains looking at each file, or sector, or each network packets provides
different levels of information and searches conducted at different abstraction layers
provide different amounts of information used to locate the targets. This is akin to a
physical crime scene search. For example, in a homicide, an investigator would define
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his/her target as the blood and would use an ordered pattern to search the physical
crime scene for blood. The investigator may discover a tiny blood splot causing
him/her to pay closer attention to a particular area in hopes of locating a better
sample. digital forensics examinations are similar where instead of ordered patterned
physical searches, examiners use visualization techniques to locate files modified at a
given time, or keyword searches to find specific values in its name or content, or hash
databases to find files with content of a specific value [42].
Phase three then compares the extracted data to the target and the examiner
determines if the object is evidence. Referring back to the physical investigation, an
investigator may locate a large pool of substance that appears to look like blood to
the naked eye. He/she can then conduct a field test, such as using luminol or UV
light, to determine whether or not the object containing the blood stain should be
considered evidence for further examination at a forensic lab. digital forensics ex-
amination is slightly different where the processes of seizing the evidence for further
analysis is unnecessary and the examination to determine if the object is evidence can
be conducted immediately. Phase four updates the knowledge base of the investiga-
tion which further defines additional targets to search for. This process repeats until
the examiner is satisfied with the amount of evidence necessary for the investigation.
4.3 User Stories
A Windows 98, Windows 7, and Windows 10 operating system images were used
as the base for the timeline visualizations. The Windows 98 image was selected
because it was the same image used in Adderley’s user study in [36]. The details of
the scenario are outlined in Appendix C of [36] and the following search keywords
were used to develop the search index within Neo4j:
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Greg Schardt; Starbucks; T-mobile; Evil; Mr. Evil; password;
Cain & Abel; Ethereal; 123 Write All Stored Passwords;
Anonymizer; CuteFTP; Look&Lan 1.0; NetStumbler; sniffer;
cracker; access point; discovery; tool; Interception; Credit;
Cards; username; hackers; hacking; hackerz; adware; back
door; black hat; bot; botnet; cookies; Denial of Service; DOS;
Distributed Denial of Service Attack; Dumpster Diving;
Easter Egg; Firewall; Gray Hat; hackers; keylogger; logic
bomb; malware; master program; payload; phishing; phreaker;
rootkit; polymorphic virus; script kiddie; social engineering;
spam; spoofing; spyware; time bomb; trojan; virus;
wardriving; white hat; worm; zero day; exploit; zombie;
install; startup
These were selected based off the scenario as well as the user study conducted in
[36].
The Windows 7 and Windows 10 images were taken from Computer Science and
Computer Engineering (CSCE) 527 Cyber Forensics class offered at Air Force Insti-
tute of Technology (AFIT). The details of the scenarios and assignments were outlined
in Appendix A and Appendix B. The Windows 7 image consisted of a scenario where
the owner of a company was murdered and the company workstation was taken as
evidence. For the Windows 10 image, the scenario involved a drug investigation where
a public computer at a library was the main source of digital evidence. These images
and scenarios were chosen to test the capabilities of ECATV on newer operating sys-
tem as well as its ability to perform when multiple users were involved on a single
image. The following search keywords were used to develop the search index for the
Windows 7 image:
Boddy; Mustard; Green; Plum; Scarlet; Peacock; White;
clients; contracts; information; technology; support; research;
development; office; manager; accountant; researcher; lead;
Boddy, INC; contracting; Google; chat; cooked books; jpg; pdf;
keylogger; outlook; emails; e-mails; startup; installation
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The Windows 10 scenario was slightly different because most of the e-mails were
not located on the actual image and were stored on an e-mail server. Because of this,
the e-mails were analyzed prior to examining the image and the following keywords
were selected:
Green; Forest; White; Pearl; Mustard; Golden; Scarlet; Ruby;
Plum; Liseran; Iris; Peacock; Pym; Gerald; txt; log; key;
keylogger; jpg; drug; pickup; locations; hackers; hack;
keystroke; logging; fish; logged; drop; and Park;
forest.green13@protonmail.com; proprietor pym’s country
store; leader copy; slots; gambling; blackmail; startup; install
These two images were unique from the first scenario because the images involved
multiple users on a single workstation. The keywords were chosen based on what
examiners may typically search in their initial examination based on the preliminary
scenario information. The usernames as search keywords also makes it easy for the
examiners to filter the events on the timeline based on the events only associated to
said user. This made it easier to view the overall activities of specific users or track
specific usage patterns. The final difference of interest between these two images
and the first was their development process. The first Windows 98 image was made
specifically to answer the questions of the scenario and in total the image was only
5 GB. The Windows 7 and Windows 10 images were developed to mimic actual user
usage in a workstation environment such as having event logs enabled and were 40
GB and 120GB respectively. It also logged onto each user account and contained the
activities done on that account to what the “user” would have fictionally accomplished
within the scenario. For example, the user Green in both scenarios was in charge of
Information Technology (IT) support and thus his activities on both images mirrored
what a typical IT support staff would conduct. ECATV makes analysis easier by
isolating events of these images down to a specific user. Then the examiner can look
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through these events and quickly determine if any activity stands out as an anomaly
not only in general sense, but also more tailored to the specifics of an investigation.
For example, as an IT staff member, Green would not normally access the contents
of client records or email the company’s customers. If these events are shown on the
timeline after a search keyword of “Green” was submitted, it would raise flags and
the examiner can began going down this trail of analysis.
4.4 Scenario 1
This scenario involved a hacker named Greg Schardt who utilized a notebook
computer and a wireless PCMCIA card attached to a external homemade 802.11b
antennae to intercept internet traffic for username & passwords and credit card num-
bers. Schardt also went by the online nickname of “Mr. Evil”. His associates stated
“Mr. Evil” would park his car within range of wireless access points and would inter-
cept traffic in hopes of obtaining sensitive information. The goal of the scenario was
to locate any hacking software Schardt utilized within the given suspect’s Windows
98 image.
4.5 ECATV Walkthrough
Scenario one was selected to demonstrate how ECATV could be used within the
digital forensics process. The first step was finding a suitable time range to search that
would make identifying the artifacts of interest easier. In the scenario, the notebook
computer was seize on 20 September 2004 so it would make sense to begin searching
from January 2004 to September 2004. The examiner can then see where the clusters
of activities were and begin narrowing down the scope. For this specific scenario, the
time range of interest was already identified during the user study. The time range
specified in [36] of 27 Aug 2004 12:00:00 AM - 27 Aug 2004 12:00:00 PM provided the
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results necessary to find the six important results of the hacking software, as shown
in Figure 26. These nodes were mostly program execution nodes and were missing
the power event and installation information abstraction nodes. This was due to the
image being a Windows 98 operating system which at the time did not have Windows
Event Log features. Since it was missing these low level events, phase two of the ingest
process failed to produce those two abstraction node types. Regardless, the timeline
was able to produce the necessary results to find the six hacking programs.
Another useful feature of a keyword search timeline is its ability to discover pat-
terns and correlation between these events, as mentioned in Section 4.3. For example
when the timeline in Figure 26 was filtered based on “ethereal” keyword search, it
produced Figure 27. This kept the program execution nodes of the packet sniffer,
Ethereal, as expected. But it also kept the nodes for NetStumbler which was a wire-
less access point discovery tool. This view also showed the user executed the access
point discovery tool prior to executing a packet sniffer. Scenario one involved the
hacker used the notebook computer and a wireless PCMCIA card to intercept in-
ternet traffic for username and passwords and credit card numbers. Based on this,
the examiner can then search for “ethereal” and “password” to discover that Cain, a
password cracker, was executed soon after, as shown in Figure 28.
Searching for “credit cards” during the same time period produced a node for
“channels.txt; keys.txt; Receipt.rtf” which was different from the normal NetStumbler
program execution nodes. The tooltip showed the traces for the node as shown in
Figure 29. Because the scenario involved stealing credit card numbers as well, the
examiner can use this as an initial point to start digging deeper into these files for
the possibility of finding what numbers were stolen. It was also interesting that a
internet relay chat program’s channel text files were executed around the same time
these tools were used. It raises the flag that the hacker was potentially part of a group
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Figure 26: Scenario 1 Timeline.
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Figure 27: Scenario 1 Timeline Ethereal Search.
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Figure 28: Scenario 1 Timeline Ethereal & Password Search.
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that discussed these techniques for intercepting wireless traffic or he was selling these
usernames & passwords and/or credit card numbers via mIRC.
Figure 29: Scenario 1 Timeline Credit Cards Search.
Overall, ECATV helped locate the six hacking software as originally intended.
But it also helped narrow down files of interest through the use of keyword searches
and automated correlation of events organized by time. The tool helps examiners
create multiple hypotheses to test and locate evidence. The traces associated to the
nodes and the timestamps also help with the reconstruction portion of the digital
forensics examination process.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 Overview
This chapter goes over the results and analysis of the three scenarios. Scenarios
two and three also include an example of how Event Correlation and Abstraction
Timeline Visualization (ECATV) can benefit the examination process.
ECATV was evaluated based on its ability to reduce the number of results to sort
through and also its completeness in presenting the key items for the three different
user scenarios. The study also examined the number of hits the keyword search of
the timeline visualization produced compared to what an Autopsy keyword search
module would produce for each of the search terms. Most examiners begin their
analysis using keyword searches to find a good place to start and to establish an
idea of what evidence can be found. ECATV aims to reduce the number of hits an
examiner must go through to identify a starting point while still having the ability to
discover the necessary information. The reduction in the number of results presented
can potentially cause the examiners to miss necessary pieces so it was important to
evaluate ECATV’s ability on result reduction and completeness.
5.2 Scenario 1
The summary of the scenario and the walkthrough of using ECATV for scenario
were outlined in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 respectively.
5.2.1 Scenario 1 Analysis and Results
Autopsy’s Keyword Search Module produced 13,107 hits across all the terms men-
tioned in Section 4.3. On the other hand, the timeline visualization produced 397
hits to sort through, which reduced the number of hits by 97%.
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As expected, the new timeline included all six hacking programs. ECATV pro-
vided the added benefit of being able to determine and find usage patterns compared
to the previous version from Adderly’s study [36].
5.3 Scenario 2
This fictitious scenario involved a millionaire and philanthropist, Boddy having
been murdered and the investigators determined whoever murdered him worked in
his contracting company, Boddy, Inc. This company consisted of Col Mustard, Mr.
Green, Prof Plum, Miss Scarlet, Mrs. Peacock, and Mrs. White. Mustard was the
vice presiden who was in charge of garnering contracts and liasing with clients. Plum
was in charge of research and development while White worked with him as the lead
researcher. Lastly, Scarlet was the office manager and Peacock was the company’s
accountant. The goals of the scenario were to reconstruct the crime that took place
based on the information found on the image and to build a narrative for the lead
investigator.
5.3.1 Scenario 2 ECATV Walkthrough
The first step for this scenario was to narrow down the time range of interest.
Figure 30 shows the initial time range of 1 Jan 1990 1:01:01 AM - 1 Jan 2019 1:01:01
AM and “startup” keyword used to see when the system was started. These power
events were generated from Windows Event Logs, specifically from entries of 6013 and
6005, as the tooltip in the figure shows. Log entries 6013 identified system uptime
reports while 6005 identified that the event logging service started. The results showed
the time range could be narrowed down to 26 Jul 2011 - 27 Jul 2011. The time range
of 25 Jul 2011 12:00:00 AM - 28 Jul 2011 12:00:00 PM was used for each subsequent
searches to ensure all activity between these dates were captured.
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Figure 30: Scenario 2 Timeline “startup” Search.
The next step involved looking for installation information to develop an idea of
what sorts of software the users interacted with. A search of 25 Jul 2011 12:00:00 AM
- 28 Jul 2011 12:00:00 PM and “install” keyword revealed various programs installed
within this time period. Figure 31 shows an attempted installation of Microsoft Office
Enterprise 2007 with an installation error status of 1603. A successful installation
would contained an installation success code of 0, as shown in Figure 32.
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Figure 31: Scenario 2 Timeline “install” Search.
Figure 32: Scenario 2 Timeline “install” Search.
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The next step was to search for clues and usage patterns to find the key pieces of
evidence within this scenario. Figure 33 confirms that Microsoft Office was success-
fully installed because Mustard was able to executed Outlook.exe the next day. The
user then narrowed down the search to Col Mustard’s activity by using the “mus-
tard” keyword. This isolated all of his program execution activities. Figure 34 shows
Mustard using Google Talk. Based on the information thus far, the user can begin
searching Google Talk logs and/or chat messages and outlook e-mail messages to
find additional clues. The user can click through the various nodes to see Mustard
also accessed various pictures/JPGs as the tooltip shows him accessing /Users/mus-
tard/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Recent/pics.lnk (shown in Figure 35).
Autopsy revealed this LNK file was linked to a public folder stored on the main
drive as C:/pics. The timeline specifically shows Mustard opening DSCF0734 and
DSCF0923 multiple times throughout the day. The user can also find that Mustard
accesses readme2.htm, USB Disk (E) drive, and “too late.txt”. The user takes note
of these patterns and should also be on the lookout for a USB drive as an additional
piece of evidence.
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Figure 33: Scenario 2 Timeline Search.
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Figure 34: Scenario 2 Timeline “mustard” Search.
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Figure 35: Scenario 2 Timeline “mustard” Search 2.
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The next user that had a high amount of activity was Peacock. The timeline
was filtered using the “peacock” keyword and the user is able to see Peacock ac-
cessed “Re new plan.txt” and “too late.txt” on the day prior to Mustard’s access,
as shown in Figure 36. Figure 37 shows Peacock accessing USB Disk (E) drive and
“Re new plan.txt” the next day. Between this time, Peacock accessed Boddy Inc.
with a trace of /Users/peacock/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Office/Recent/Boddy
Inc.LNK, as shown in Figure 38. The user can then use Autopsy with that specific
trace and find that the lnk file is associated to a database named Boddy Inc. Figure 39
shows a snippet of the database which contains various information on the company’s
customers. The user can take note that Peacock was the company’s accountant but
should raise a flag that the database was specifically accessed between the two times
shown in Figure 36 and Figure 37 where Peacock accessed “Re new plan.txt”. The
timeline also revealed prior to Peacock accessing the database, Microsoft Excel and
Microsoft Access were launched. Another item of interest was Peacock accessing Cisco
3550 manual PDF shortly after touching USB Disk (E) drive and “Re new plan.txt”
(Figure 40). The scenario stated Green was the company’s Information Technology
support. This behaviour of an accountant going through an ethernet switch manual
should raise a flag.
75
Figure 36: Scenario 2 Timeline “peacock” Search.
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Figure 37: Scenario 2 Timeline “peacock” Search 2.
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Figure 38: Scenario 2 Timeline “peacock” Search 3.
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Figure 39: Scenario 2 Boddy Inc. Database Snippet.
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Figure 40: Scenario 2 “peacock” Search 4.
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The examiner can then determine a connection between Mustard and Peacock
based on the information thus far. Autopsy’s e-mail search module produced mes-
sages between Peacock and Mustard, taken from various Outlook.pst sources. These
messages, Figure 41, showed Mustard and Peacock stating they left messages but with
no additional context of the actual message. A close look at the programs executed
(Figure 33) between the time range of 25 Jul 2011 12:00:00 AM - 28 Jul 2011 12:00:00
PM showed “Microsoft” nodes with a trace of /ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows/S-
tart Menu/Programs/Camouflage. A simple Google search revealed Camouflage was
a program that provided steganography capabilities. A keyword search of “peacock
mustard Microsoft”, shown in Figure 42, revealed that this program was executed
between the time Peacock accessed “Re new plan.txt” and reaccessed the same file
as well as USB Disk (E) drive. The examiner can also determine Camouflage was
accessed after Peacock touched the Boddy, Inc. database. It was evident through
Autopsy that Boddy sent Mustard an e-mail needing to talk about accounting er-
rors, as shown in Figure 41. Based on the e-mails, the activity between Mustard
and Peacock, the examiner can determine some scheme was going on between Mus-
tard and Peacock involving the company’s clients and Boddy was beginning to notice
the errors. Due to Camoflouge’s presence, the user should also use steganography
on the the various files Mustard and Peacock touched between this time period to
find more information. These files include DSCF0734.JPG, DSCF0923.JPG, “too
late.txt”, “Re new plan.txt”, and “cisco 3550 man.pdf”.
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Figure 41: Scenario 2 Emails.
Figure 42: Scenario 2 Timeline “peacock mustard Microsoft” Search.
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5.3.2 Scenario 2 Analysis and Results
Autopsy’s Keyword Search Module produced 65,513 hits across all the terms men-
tioned in Section 4.3. On the other hand, the timeline visualization produced 142
hits to sort through, which reduced the number of hits by 99%.
The combination of Autopsy and ECATV was able to locate most of the im-
portant evidence. The tools located 9 out of 13 pieces of digital evidence planted
for the scenario. Many of the pieces of evidence were e-mail messages between the
various employees, which were located using the e-mail search module of Autopsy.
ECATV helped spur this search by showing the installation process of Microsoft Of-
fice 2007 as well as various employees accessing Outlook. Unfortunately, the timeline
was unable to pinpoint the actual Google Talk messages, but at least notified the
examiner of its existence and usage. Three pieces of digital evidence were “hidden”
using stegonagraphy on the following files: “cisco 3550 man.pdf”, DSCF0744.JPG,
and “README2.HTM”. ECATV was able to locate “cisco 3550 man.pdf” and
“README2.HTM” and the employee(s) who accessed them. It was unable to find
DSCF0744.JPG being executed by an employee, but it did demonstrate Mustard ac-
cessing similar JPEGs, DSCF0734.JPG and DSCF0923.JPG. These files were located
in C:/pics, which was the parent directory for the key piece, DSCF0744.JPG, that
ECATV was unable to display on its timeline. More importantly, Scenario 2 was able
to demonstrate ECATV’s capabilities in usage patterns. The tool made it easy to
discover Camoflauge and led examiners down the path of stenography as a technique
to look out for and even the specific software utilized. It also helped draw the con-
nection between Mustard and Peacock. The last piece of evidence was an e-mail from
Boddy that Scarlet forged using his account. This piece was found entirely using Au-
topsy’s e-mail search module. The e-mails alone made it evident Boddy was involved
in an affair with Scarlet and when Boddy attempted to end it, Scarlet threatened
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him, stating “You will be sorry if you break up with me boddy.” The forged e-mail
sent to the entire company shows the e-mail was sent from Boddy, but the source of
the message originated from Scarlet’s Outlook.pst.
ECATV was unable to find the actual “cooked books” hidden through an alternate
data stream. But Scenario 2 demonstrated that the tool and the e-mails helped
establish the theory Peacock and Mustard were altering what were written in the
accounts. The examiner would have eventually found the actual document through
the clues and information discovered throughout this process. It is just that ECATV
was unable to locate the actual file. The last two pieces of digital evidence missed
were the clues in the slack space of the master boot record and the main drive. These
would not have been discovered because the ingest process did not account for data
located in the slack space and is a limitation of ECATV. Overall, ECATV was able
to help locate 69% pieces of digital evidence.
5.4 Scenario 3
This scenario began with an altercation that took place in the Bredon Library.
Police responded to a report that Golden Mustard and Ruby Scarlet were arguing over
use of one of the library’s computers. During the arrest, police discovered narcotics
in Mustard’s possession. The computer’s hard drive, along with a pile of USB drives
near the computer were seized as well. The lead investigator submitted a request
to the email providers of the local users and copies of the emails were provided to
the forensic examiner. The goals were similar to scenario two and examiners were
charged with building a narrative of the case for the lead investigator as well as a
reconstruction of the crimes.
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5.4.1 Scenario 3 ECATV Walkthrough
Again, the first step for this scenario was to narrow down the time range of interest.
Figure 43 shows the initial time range of 1 Jan 1990 12:00:00 AM - 1 Jan 2019 12:00:00
PM and “startup” keyword used to see when the system was started. The results
showed the time range could be narrowed down to 30 May 2017 - 22 Jun 2017. The
time range of 30 May 2017 12:00:00 AM - 22 Jun 2017 12:00:00 PM was used for each
subsequent searches to ensure all activity between these dates were captured.
Figure 43: Scenario 2 Timeline “startup” Search.
The second step is the same as the second step in scenario two, which entailed
searching for installed programs. A search of a 30 May 2017 12:00:00 AM - 22 Jun
2017 12:00:00 PM and “install” showed a Google update finishing. The other events
showed various Microsoft programs, the English versions, were installed as well as a
Windows 10 update.
This scenario was different from scenario two in Section 5.3 because there were
seven different USB’s that potentially contained key pieces of evidence. This scenario
also involved a lead investigator who submitted a request to e-mail providers to obtain
the messages of the local users. Many of the actual key pieces of digital evidence
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were not found on the Windows image, but ECATV was still useful in identifying
the remnants these pieces left behind when interacting with the workstation. The
scenario essentially involved the user, Pearl White, having Golden Mustard set up
drug deals. Mustard accomplished this through various e-mails he sent to Pym.
During this time, White embedded a message using stegonagraphy onto fish 4.jpg.
The text file contained the message “The next exchange will at 4pm on the corner
of 9th and Lake.” White also embedded a message onto the Black Moor Fish.jpg’s
alternate data stream that contained the message “Blackmail is your problem not
mine - you owe me, even more now. Next exchange at 7th and Maple at 7pm.” The
other pieces of digital evidence were associated to Forest Green. This user installed
a keylogger Powershell script onto the system and began blackmailing Mustard. The
key pieces of evidences that revealed this information were logged.txt and and e-mail
from Green to Mustard which stated “I have proof that you are working for the
notorious Queen White and if you don’t leave me $1,000 in the pipe by the computer
tomorrow I will notify the authorities!” ECATV was evaluated based on not only
its ability to find the digital evidence of the Windows image, but also its ability to
provide the examiner with a solid base to work on rather than aimlessly searching
the image.
The third search, Figure 44, provided an overview of the active users within the
time range of 30 May 2017 12:00:00 AM - 22 Jun 2017 12:00:00 PM. We determined
that Mustard, Green, White, and Peacock were the most active users based on the
results. A search with the same time range but with the “white” keyword revealed
White accessed various JPGs. This search was further filtered to include “jpg” which
showed a Windows Powershell was launched (Figure 45) at approximately 21 Jun
2017 06:20 AM. Then between 07:40 AM and 07:50 AM, White accessed fish 4.lnk,
Black Moor Fish.lnk, and the Public Pictures file location, as shown in Figures 46,
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47, and 48.
Figure 44: Scenario 3 Timeline User Activity Search.
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Figure 45: Scenario 3 Timeline “white” Search.
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Figure 46: Scenario 3 Timeline “white jpg” Search.
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Figure 47: Scenario 3 Timeline “white jpg” Search.
90
Figure 48: Scenario 3 Timeline “white jpg” Search.
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It is important to note these searches and ECATV did not provide the actual
pieces of evidence, such as the message that were hidden within the alternate data
stream or embedded using stenography. But it located the items of interest allow-
ing the examiners to begin drilling down on these specific files. The same can be
said when using the keyword “green”. This search revealed a USB was inserted and
mounted as the F: drive and was named GREEN (Figure 49). Soon after Green ac-
cessed Parse Keys.lnk (Figure 50). A deeper dive into Autopsy showed this link file
originated from Parse Keys.ps1 from the GREEN USB, as shown in Figure 51. This
search through ECATV identified that out of the seven USB’s, the GREEN USB re-
quired further examination. The USB in fact contains evidence of a keylogger and the
trace revealed in Figure 50, which was /Users/Green/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft-
/Windows/Recent/Parse Keys.lnk, helped tie in the fact the key logger originated
from Green or whoever had access to Green’s user account on the Windows worksta-
tion.
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Figure 49: Scenario 3 Timeline “green” Search.
93
Figure 50: Scenario 3 Timeline “green” Search.
94
Figure 51: Scenario 3 Parse Keys.lnk.
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5.4.2 Scenario 3 Analysis and Results
Autopsy’s Keyword Search Module produced 159,918 hits across all the terms
mentioned in Section 4.3. On the other hand, the timeline visualization produced
225 hits to sort through, which reduced the number of hits by 99%.
The scenario involved locating 13 pieces of key evidence but two of them were
e-mails which were obtained from the email providers. Thus ECATV was evaluated
based on its ability to find the other 11 pieces. The tool helped locate eight of
these pieces, which included the alternate data stream from Black Moor Fish.jpg, the
embedded message on fish 4.jpg, the keylogger, the Powershell being executed, the
downloading of the fish pictures into the Public folder, and the associated activities.
ECATV was unable to locate two pieces of digital evidence associated to the
execution of WinHex; one by Mustard and one by White. These pieces of evidence
would tip the examiner to look for embedding in the partition slack, but ECATV alone
was unable to identify this. The tool also failed to locate the log file the keylogger
produced. This text file contained all the keys that were logged since Green installed
the program. It showed evidence of Mustard typing an email to White stating it
was “the last time I arrange a drop for you” as well as the message “My debts
should be fully repaid!” The actual file, logged.txt, was on the GREEN USB and the
examiner would have eventually located it after discovering the USB was important.
But ECATV was unable to create an abstraction node for the execution of logged.txt
associated to any of the users. This is because for some reason the Windows image
did not create a prefetch or LNK associated to logged.txt. Autopsy revealed no such
artifact existed. Regardless this was one of pieces of digital evidence planted for the
scenario and ECATV was unable to identify it.
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5.5 Summary
This research evaluated ECATV based on two objective measurements; the num-
ber of the key pieces of evidence the tool was able to locate and the number of search
results it produced compared to another open source digital forensics tool, Autopsy.
Overall, ECATV reduced the number of search results by at least 90% for the three
scenarios, significantly reducing the amount of search terms an examiner would have
to sort through. The tool also located around 70% of the key pieces of digital ev-
idence. There were some limitations to ECATV and its ingest process that caused
the tool to be unable to locate some of the evidence. Table 1 shows the breakdown
of the results for each scenario.
Table 1: ECATV and Scenario Results.
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Digital Evidence Located 6 out of 6 (100%) 9 out of 13 (69%) 8 out of 11 (73%)
Search Results 
Produced by ECATV
397 142 225
Search Results 
Produced by Autopsy
13,107 65,513 159,918
Percentage of Reduction 
of Search Results
97% 99% 99%
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VI. Conclusions
6.1 Summary
This study looked into the possibility of integrating temporal abstraction [33] and
interactive visualization [36] into a digital forensics examiners’ current process. This
document presents the entire digital forensics examination process. Event Correlation
and Abstraction Timeline Visualization (ECATV) is presented as a novel examination
capability that works with the existing process. Specifically, ECATV adds a keyword
search feature onto the timeline to match the process, better filter results, and in-
crease the robustness of its operational capabilities. This was done through dissecting
Autopsy’s communication method, called the Blackboard, between various modules
and locating the necessary data to augment the timeline visualization’s database.
Overall, ECATV was able to significantly reduce the number of search results
by more than 90%. The tool was tested on three different scenarios and was able to
locate about 70% of the key pieces of digital evidence. The objective of this study was
to reduce the amount of time spent during the analysis portion of a digital forensics
examination by combining different strategies aimed at the same goal. This was done
by combining the research done in [33] and [36] to create a timeline visualization
backed with a native graph database that was filterable with keywords. Testing
ECATV through the three different scenarios revealed that the tool made it easier
to detect patterns and user behavior. When the image contained multiple users, the
keyword filterable timeline made it easier to isolate the activities of a single user. It
also had the ability to filter results down to multiple specific users making it easier to
detect interactions between various users, a feature useful on enterprise workstations.
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6.2 Limitations
Currently there are three main limitations with ECATV. First, the tool relies on
Windows Event Logs to create its power events abstraction nodes. If logging was not
enabled, ECATV ultimately will be unable to show when the computer in question
was started. This brings us to the second limitation being the operating system. The
tools used during the ingest process were specific to Windows images. ECATV would
not work on Linux and Mac operating systems. Lastly, the tool was unable to locate
key pieces of digital evidence if they were hidden in the slack space. For these cases,
the examiner would have to manually search through the space to find the evidence.
6.3 Future Work
Future work for the development of ECATV would involve streamlining the pro-
cess into a single module for Autopsy. Currently the ingest process combines the use
of various tools and different stages. It can be a labor intensive process that requires
knowledge of multiple different languages, databases, and schemas. The tools written
for the first phase of the ingest process was also split up into multiple different docker
containers. Streamlining the ingest process into a single pipeline would allow a larger
population of forensic examiners to take advantage of ECATV’s benefits. Developing
a single module for Autopsy would also enable the ability for adhoc keyword searches.
ECATV currently takes the results from Autopsy’s keyword search and combines its
results into ECATV’s Neo4j database. But if it were developed as a single module for
Autopsy, it would be able to communicate with Autopsy through the Blackboard and
automatically add the results into its Neo4j database. This would allow for evolving
search terms and examiners to add search keywords on-the-fly.
The other piece of future work would involve conducting a user study on ECATV.
This research evaluated the objective benefits of ECATV but was unable to test the
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subjective ones. A user study would test whether the tool works as intended and
reduces the human analysis time spent during a digital forensics examination. It
would also determine the ease of the tool’s usability. If the tool was difficult to utilize
for the average user, it would defeat the purpose of attempting to reduce the human
analysis portion.
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Appendix A. Windows 7 Lab 3
Cyber Forensics - CSCE 527 Media Imaging and Analysis
Purpose: Image and examine a HD and unlock its many secrets.
Scenario: Millionaire and noted philanthropist Mr. Boddy has been murdered.
Since Mr. Boddys wife was out of the country and is the primary interest owner of
the company, the investigators have ruled out romantic and inheritance as motives.
The investigators are certain that whoever murdered Mr. Boddy must work in his
AF contracting company Boddy, Inc. Boddy, Inc. is a small business and consists
of Mr. Boddy, Col Mustard, Mr. Green, Prof Plum, Miss Scarlet, Mrs. Peacock,
and Mrs. White. Col Mustard is the vice president, and is in charge of schmoozing
clients and garnering contracts. Mr. Green is in charge of Information Technology
support. Prof Plum is director in charge of research and development. Miss Scarlet
is the office manager. Mrs. Peacock is the companys accountant. Mrs. White works
with Prof Plum as the lead researcher.
Assignment: Perform an analysis of the imaged drive and media. The hard drive
image is available on the LISSARD share drive. You will have imaged all of the media,
except for the hard drive during scene processing. The goal is a full reconstruction of
the crime(s). Find as much evidence as you can. Determine who has committed the
crime, why they committed the crime, and the timeline associated with the crime.
Build a narrative of the case for the lead investigator. Document where and how
you find it. The search terms cleared by the warrant for this search include all the
employees names, and aspects concerning Mr. Boddys demise. If you evolve search
terms, justify why you evolved them. Prepare a written report indicating the teams
findings and the techniques used. Be careful to maintain a correct trail of evidence,
including tagging, checking in and out of evidence, etc. Also, discuss in length the
tools that you used.
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Appendix B. Windows 10 Lab 3
Cyber Forensics - CSCE 527 Media Imaging and Analysis
Purpose: Examine a HD image and unlock its secrets.
Scenario: A hard drive from a computer from the Bredon Library has been seized.
It is requested that you examine the image, it is suspected of containing evidence
related to illegal narcotics. The hard drive is part of an ongoing investigation in which
police responded to a report of an altercation between Mr. Golden Mustard and a
Miss Ruby Scarlet arguing over the computer. During the course of the response,
narcotics were found in Mr. Mustards possession. There are also a pile of USB drives
that were seized as well. The lead investigator has submitted a request to the email
providers for the local users. You should have the cloud email available for analysis
in a week.
Assignment: Perform an analysis of the imaged drive and media. The hard drive
image is available on the LISSARD share drive. You will have imaged all of the media,
except for the hard drive during scene processing. The goal is a full reconstruction of
the crime(s). Find as much evidence as you can. Determine who has committed the
crime, why they committed the crime, and the timeline associated with the crime.
Build a narrative of the case for the lead investigator. Document where and how you
find it. As presented in the scenario, the search terms associated with the warrant
are for information on narcotics. If you evolve search terms, justify why you evolved
them. Prepare a written report indicating the teams findings and the techniques used.
Be careful to maintain a correct trail of evidence, including tagging, checking in and
out of evidence, etc. Also, discuss in length the tools that you used.
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